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Introduction
With the recent decision to send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, there is little doubt that the
stakes are increasing as America enters its ninth year of war. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that
the additional troops and associated increase in funding will produce decisive results. Indeed, if the last
eight years in Afghanistan are an indicator, the situation is likely to get much worse before it improves.
Therefore, it is critical that the additional assets being allocated to continue the fight in Afghanistan be
employed in a manner that produces optimal results in creating stability. This paper will show that the
key to determining the most optimal employment of assets is to first ensure that the problem is well
defined and understood.
There are three fundamental topics that are important to understanding the current problem in
Afghanistan. First, it is clear that despite a gradual increase in funding for the war in Afghanistan over
the last eight years, overall stability in the country is getting worse.[1] A second aspect of the problem is
that resources have not been managed in an effective manner: a problem further compounded by
rampant corruption. Finally, there have been many costly individual programs initiated by the U.S. in
Afghanistan that contributed very little to stability, and in some cases, fostered instability. This has
resulted in a poor cost-benefit ratio for U.S. taxpayers.
Decreasing Stability Despite Increased Funding
The available evidence clearly suggests that stability is worsening despite increased funding. Since
2001, the U.S. has gradually increased the amount of money it spends on the war in Afghanistan.[2] For
example, the U.S. government spent $14.7 billion and $14.5 billion on the war in Afghanistan in 2003
and 2004, respectively. These numbers increased to $20 billion in 2005, $29 billion in 2006, $36.9
billion in 2007, and $34 billion in 2008. In sum, the U.S. government has already spent more than $173
billion on the war in Afghanistan.[3] This translates to roughly $2.4 billion per month through 2008, and
includes more than $15.6 billion on Afghan security forces over the course of the conflict.
Despite the increasing expenditure of America’s resources, there are myriad indicators that stability is
only getting worse in Afghanistan and that the U.S. is losing the war.[4] Specifically, there has been a
steady escalation of violence in Afghanistan since 2005 in terms of incidents and the number of U.S.
soldiers killed and wounded.[5] Further, insurgent attacks have intensified and become more
technologically sophisticated, and the government is losing the support of the population.[6] In addition,
between 2006 and 2007, kinetic attacks against U.S. forces increased by 40% and from 2007 to 2008
there was an additional 33% increase in kinetic attacks.[7] Another indicator of increasing violence is
that between 2007 and 2008, U.S. casualties from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) increased by
27%. Finally, between 2007 and 2008, attacks on Afghan government officials and facilities increased
by 119%, and Afghan civilian deaths increased by between 40 and 46%.[8]
The Afghan government is losing ground to the Taliban and other warlords and criminal elements daily,
and as much as one-third of the country is controlled by these factions.[9] One of the most significant
indicators to both the coalition and to Afghans that they are losing the war was the June 12, 2008,
Taliban attack against the Sarposa prison in Kandahar that resulted in 1200 inmates being set free.[10]
In addition, both U.S. and outside assessments of the state of the war in Afghanistan indicate that
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efforts to stabilize Afghanistan are largely failing, and that even in areas that were previously considered
secure such as in the capital of Kabul, there have been an increase in the number of military and civilian
deaths.[11]
Other indicators that stability is decreasing are that between 2002 and 2006, Taliban presence in the
country increased by approximately 400% in terms of area of land that they control or heavily influence,
and that Taliban strength in Afghanistan increased from approximately 4,000 to 17,000 in that same
timeframe[12]. In addition, the Taliban are making a number of large gains in the south of the country
and the poorly paid and under trained ANA is unable to hold the country even after U.S. forces clear an
area.[13] Finally, much of the population is becoming disillusioned with the corrupt Afghan national and
local governments and western occupiers. One reason for this is that despite 7 years of U.S. presence
in the country, Afghanistan continues to have one of the lowest per capita Gross Domestic Products
(GDPs) in the world at $350, and average life expectancy is only 44 years.[14]
Another major factor that is creating disillusionment in the eyes of many Afghans is the inability of the
government to provide for basic health care needs.[15] For example, despite the many billions of dollars
provided in assistance to the Afghan government between 2001 and 2006, only $11 per capita was
spent on health care. Afghans realized that while the government highlighted that health care coverage
expanded from 9% of the population in 2002 to approximately 90% of the population in 2006, the quality
of basic services remained remarkably poor . The problems included long wait times, no laboratory
services, almost zero access to vital drugs, and a noted disrespect by health professionals for patients.
[16]
Another indicator of dismal health care is that the second largest city in Afghanistan, Kandahar, does not
have level three (advanced surgical) care capability and all patients must be sent to Kabul, the only city
in the country with this capability. Because of this lack of advanced medical facilities in Afghanistan,
many patients go without treatment due to a lack of capacity and long distances between virtually any
city or rural area in the country and the capital city.[17] Final indicators of the poor state of health care in
Afghanistan are that 250 out of every 1000 children die before the age of five and that the top causes of
adult deaths are infectious disease and trauma.[18]
The state of women has not improved much during the U.S. occupation either. As the average Afghan
woman has 7.5 children during her life and with a 1.9% chance of dying on any given child birth
experience, this means that the average woman has a 14.25% chance of dying during her life while
giving birth to a child. This is the second highest maternal mortality rate in the world.[19] Another
problem that exacerbates the poor conditions for women is Afghanistan’s 40% unemployment rate.[20]
A final statistic that indicates not only the poor conditions for women, but for the entire population, is
that 70% of the population lives on less than one dollar per day.[21]
Another reason for increased disillusionment among Afghans is that they see little improvement in terms
of many other issues that are most important to them, namely improving basic necessities such as
electricity, jobs, water, education and roads. Indeed, one statistic that helps to understand Afghan
disillusionment with the national government and their growing support for the Taliban is the fact that the
Afghan government can only raise $13 per capita in revenue each year. This is barely enough to
purchase one case of soda for each Afghan citizen from the new Coca Cola factory that recently began
operation in Afghanistan.[22]
Seven years after the fall of the Taliban regime, Afghanistan is still struggling to develop an effective
governmental system that can provide for security, improve the nation’s economy, and enhance social
conditions. In addition, in 2007 insurgent attacks closed over 35 percent of the schools, opium
production reached record levels, and a lack of economic growth made it impossible to meet the
population’s most basic needs.[23] A final indicator of the instability in Afghanistan is growth of the illicit
drug trade. The Afghan drug trade grew by 49 percent in 2006, and police chiefs in poppy-growing
districts will pay up to $100,000 for a six month appointment, for a salary of just $60 per month.[24]
Ineffective Resource Management
One of the most important reasons for the current problems in Afghanistan is not having enough
resources and not using them effectively. The single biggest complicating factor that makes resource
allocation so difficult in Afghanistan is the widespread corruption that occurs within the country. Indeed,
corruption and inefficiency are so rampant among Afghan bureaucrats that Afghanistan is currently
listed as number 172 out of 180 countries on the global corruption index.[25] The government spent
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only 44% of the money it received on development projects in 2006, with the rest going largely to
personal bank accounts overseas. In addition, when money is spent, it is often on poorly designed and
conceived projects that do little to improve the quality of life for the average Afghan.[26] Consequently,
approximately two-thirds of foreign funds are brought into the country outside of the government’s
allocation system, but naturally, this has a negative effect in establishing the government’s
legitimacy.[27]
Another major problem with resource allocation in Afghanistan is that the United States and the coalition
cannot seem to figure out how many troops are needed to get the job done. Some studies show that
even an increase in International Stability Assistance Force (ISAF) troops to somewhere between
200,000 and 250,000 soldiers is unlikely to completely resolve the security dilemma in Afghanistan.[28]
In addition, other studies have demonstrated that determining the correct number of troops needed to
provide security is among the most important tasks in conducting counter insurgency warfare. One study
showed that the biggest comparison between Afghanistan and previous U.S. failures in Lebanon and
Somalia was an increased reliance on technology, poor human intelligence, and insufficient force ratios
to accomplish the missions.[29]
Another major problem to creating stability thus far in Afghanistan is the lack of viable political
institutions, which encourages individuals and groups to undertake initiatives that address their own
personal agendas instead of that of the state.[30] One reason for this is that too much effort and focus
have been placed on one man, President Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan’s president. Instead, more effort
should be concentrated on establishing a legitimate representative government system that provides for
effective public administration at all levels of government and allowing for accountability of government
leaders. This trend has led to ineffective resource allocation by Afghan officials as each looks after his
or her own personal interests in lieu of what is best for the country.[31]
Further, the international community is trying to complete too many objectives simultaneously, and in
doing so, is not accomplishing any of them as there are not enough resources to do them all
concurrently. Among the competing goals are the need to destroy the Taliban, create a functional
democracy, eliminate narcotics, build a legitimate central government, and improve human rights.[32]
This creates the conflicting challenges of establishing a coherent national government without first
addressing the many warring factions within the state. Along with this, another area that has been
critiqued harshly has been efforts to repair the economy without first creating a literate population. A final
example of competing objectives has been efforts to stop cross-border Taliban incursions between
Afghanistan and Pakistan without first creating an effective foreign policy arm within the Afghan
government to build a relationship with the Pakistan government. [33]
Indeed, the problem with Pakistan is not trivial.[34] Much of the problem has been a result of
Afghanistan’s failure to forgive Pakistan’s support of the Taliban regime in the 1990s. Another
complicating factor has been President Karzai’s threats to violate Pakistan’s sovereignty by sending
troops to attack the Taliban inside Pakistan. These factors have prevented Afghanistan from forming a
strategic alliance with Pakistan against the Taliban.[35]
Other resource allocation problems have derived from a lack of planning for Afghanistan due to a
primary focus in Iraq and ISAF policy has not been consistent or well thought out. Indeed, there has not
been enough troops in Afghanistan, the employment of resources such as air power often leads to
drastic repercussion and alienation of the population, and there is still a drastic shortage in electricity
and running water.[36] Another problem that detracts from effective resource management are that
coalition actions lack unity of effort due to each nation placing their own caveats on employment of their
forces and an overall poor ability to coordinate operations with Afghan security forces. Other problems
that lead to poor resource management are a lack of key enablers to support military operations such as
aviation assets, ISR capabilities, and language skills.[37]
Another problem is that there has been a “strategic drift, conflicting tactics, and too few troops” which
has contributed to poor progress in Afghanistan.[38] This lack of unity of effort has led to sub-optimal,
and in some cases poor resource allocation within Afghanistan. Another factor that complicates the
problem is that most of the conflict in Afghanistan is rural, and therefore regional diplomacy is much
more important than it is in Iraq. Part of this effort requires empowerment of local officials while showing
the people that the Afghan government and coalition can provide the basic services that they need.
Indeed, this finding is supported by lessons from Vietnam and the study of other insurgencies. These
studies showed that more focus should be on protecting civilians in lieu of destroying the enemy,
assuming greater risk, and using the minimum force necessary to accomplish objectives.[39]
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Another example suggesting there is a substantial resource allocation problem in Afghanistan is
evidenced in reviewing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) findings and conclusions that
followed from the summer of 2008 NATO conference in Bucharest. The summit concluded that there is a
need to fill ISAF manning shortfalls, and that training teams and critical enablers such as combat
aviation and engineers need to be strengthened with more personnel and equipment.[40] Summit
participants also highlighted that the goal is to achieve an 80,000 strong ANA by 2010. These findings
are interesting because the NATO goal of 80,000 soldiers for the ANA is only one-third of what many
counterinsurgency experts and official army doctrine state are needed to win against an insurgency.[41]
From a historical perspective, Afghanistan and its diverse citizens have been at the crossroads of many
great empires ranging from the Persians, to the Greeks, the Mongols, the British and Russia. Despite
being invaded on numerous occasions throughout their history, Afghans have been able to avoid being
conquered and oppressed by fleeing into the country’s deep mountain ranges that are nearly
impenetrable for invading forces. From these experiences, Afghans developed a unique individuality and
tribal loyalty and developed a fierce and renowned warrior ethic. Consequently, many of the challenges
that the U.S. currently faces with regards to resource management and creating stability derives from
Afghanistan’s unique history.[42]
A History of Failed Programs
There are many examples of US funded programs in Afghanistan that have failed and ultimately
produced a waste of resources. One example is the $1.6 billion national Civil Service Training Institute
and other technical assistance programs that failed due to widespread incompetence and
corruption.[43] As an example of this, only half of the judicial system positions in Afghanistan are filled
and a mere one-third of these judges have a university degree. In addition, Afghanistan’s traditional
tribal law has historically been effective for the population, and even the Taliban’s harsh judicial system
was more efficient than the current corrupt system. [44] Indeed, ordinary citizens in Kandahar province
have actually turned to Taliban courts to address their grievances instead of the corrupt and ineffective
government courts.[45] There is also evidence that this is occurring on a larger level throughout the
entire country. The main reason for this is that the population does not trust the corrupt government
officials and leaders.[46] One reason that judges are so prone to corruption is that they make just $40 to
$60 per month, while a low ranking drug smuggler earns over $1000 per month.[47]
Attempts at legal reform since 2001 have also been largely ineffective. Despite efforts by the West to
create a new justice system in Afghanistan, it has largely failed because in order for it to be seen as
legitimate by Afghans, it must be based on the foundations of traditional Afghan justice, which are
Islamic law and Afghan traditions. Complicating efforts to reform the judicial system, roughly 90% of
government expenditures on the justice system come through foreign funds. In addition, approximately
75% of this is administered at the district level or below, which means senior Afghan leaders have little
say in justice sector reform and feel that the system is not inclusive or accommodating.[48]
Indeed, the push for a Western based legal system has created a perception that U.S. forces are
attempting to use Western legal morals in an attempt to supplant Islamic codes. This perception led to
an ideological chasm between the people and the Afghan government regarding the new judicial
system, a chasm that is similar to the more general one that exists between Islamists and the West.
Consequently, much of the public, especially those who live in rural areas, have chosen in the last few
years to support the Taliban system which is perceived as being more Afghan, more Islamic, and most
importantly, more effective.[49]
Another failed program has been money spent by the U.S. and its allies in trying to create a democratic
government in Afghanistan. Indeed, the Afghan government faces so many challenges that it has been
overwhelmed in many regards. Many of the problems currently challenging the Karzai government were
also faced by the Soviet Union and Afghan communist leaders during the1980-1988 war in
Afghanistan.[50] One example was efforts to change and modernize some aspects of Afghan life, such
as government and human rights, which alienated and even infuriated many Afghans. This, in turn,
encouraged the Afghans to fight against the Soviet supported regime.[51] In addition, resources spent
on democratic reform and democratic judicial systems can actually inhibit an occupying force’s ability to
create stability in the short term if the population’s traditional political systems are diametrically opposed
to democracy or the preconditions for democracy are not met.[52]
Another example of a program that has completely failed in Afghanistan involves women’s rights. While
the new Afghan government has made inroads towards providing more freedom and rights to women
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such as the availability of education, much more work needs to be done. One example is that in 2006,
there were 106 cases in which women committed self-immolation in order to protest their dire and
hopeless position in society. Other dismal statistics that indicate the poor condition of women and lack
of progress in women’s affairs are that 57% of Afghan women marry before age 16 and 70-80% of
marriages are arranged or forced marriages. In addition, the probability that a girl  will graduate from
primary school is half that for a boy, and Afghanistan has the second highest maternal mortality rate in
the world.[53]
There have been other failed programs in Afghanistan. For example, a number of U.S. efforts and
initiatives such as making deals with Taliban and criminal leaders that have backfired. Attempts to build
the ANA and other Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have failed in both qualitative and
quantitative terms. Billions of dollars have been spent on the ANA but there are currently only 80,000
soldiers, which are not enough and the ANA has a dearth of enablers with only 31 supporting
helicopters. One reason for the failure to create successful ANSF is that there is a lack of training teams
with only 78% of positions for the ANA and 33% of the positions for the ANP being filled.[54] Finally, the
failure of ANSF has been a major factor in the rise of the neo-Taliban movement in southern
Afghanistan.[55]
Because President Karzai was unable to create an effective ANSF early in his tenure, Karzai attempted
to use local warlords to provide security. Consequently, arms shipments and monetary payments were
delivered to warlords to make this possible.[56] This plan failed as Afghan warlords are now seen as a
major threat to security and an obstacle in creating a legitimate government.[57] One of the biggest
failures with regards to warlords were the weapons buy-back programs that attempted to get warring
factions to turn-in their weapons and return to more peaceful activities. With the failure of Afghanistan’s
own police and army to provide security combined with insufficient numbers of ISAF troops to provide
the same, many Afghans in the southern region identified the Taliban as being most capable of
providing security, especially among the lowest members of society[58].
Much of the reason for the U.S.’s failure in Afghanistan can be attributed to the success of Taliban
forces in striking quickly and effectively in many places around Afghanistan while eluding major drawn
out battles with U.S. forces.[59] The implication is that the U.S. should not focus on killing and capturing
the enemy; instead the U.S. should focus on increased use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
and widespread economic development. This argument is supported by the fact that one of the principal
reasons for government and coalition failure thus far has been an inability of the Afghan national
government to extend its presence throughout the country. This resulted in an inability to secure rural
areas and improve quality of life, especially in the southern half of the country.[60]
In addition, there have been too few forces on the ground which has prevented U.S. forces from holding
terrain once it is cleared of the enemy. This allows the Taliban to return shortly after U.S. forces clear
them out. This issue is complicated, however, and is not as simple as merely increasing U.S. troop
levels. Increasing the number of U.S. forces could easily create more violent engagements with the
Taliban and Al Qaeda.[61] This is important to consider as much of the money spent on U.S. kinetic
operations to destroy Taliban and terrorist forces have backfired when innocent civilians were killed in
the process. In 2007 alone, at least 1500 civilians lost their lives in the cross fire between ISAF and
Taliban forces, with 47 deaths and over 100 civilian injuries in one errant air strike alone. In addition, the
policy of using what is perceived as random air strikes that often kill civilians has been one of the major
factors that has turned much of the population against the Afghan government and coalition forces
operating in Afghanistan.[62]
Another major problem that has contributed to the U.S. failure in Afghanistan is the allocation of
resources to the wrong problems. Specifically, money allocated to war fighting and even the
development of democracy has contributed very little to creating stability, and may even harm efforts to
create stability. Some arguments have been made that more money should be spent on programs to
bring about national reconciliation between tribes and warring factions[63]. In addition, popular
programs such as projects dedicated towards enhancing education and schools for both boys and girls
are failing because of a lack of security.[64] In 2007 alone, insurgent attacks forced 35% of the schools
in Afghanistan that had been built by coalition forces or with coalition money to be closed.[65]
A Way Ahead
First, the previous discussion clearly demonstrates that the way ahead will not be easy. In many ways
the problem in Afghanistan is much more complex and difficult than what the U.S. has faced in Iraq. To
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be successful, the U.S. must implement short term measures to decrease the violence and bring
immediate security to the population. In itself, however, these short term efforts will be for nothing if the
U.S. and the government of Afghanistan cannot implement several long term changes.
Immediately, the U.S. must focus entirely on the population of Afghanistan and address their immediate
needs. If the U.S. and the Karzai government cannot stop the population from turning to the Taliban,
they will fail. The first and quintessential condition that needs to be achieved is security. To do this,
special focus will have to be placed on the major population centers, but the security of villagers in
outlying areas cannot be overlooked either. Thus, a substantial amount of security forces will be
needed, numbers that the U.S. and its allies are simply incapable of providing. Thus, to gain these
forces, the U.S. and the coalition will need to contribute more forces themselves, focus on improving
both the quality and quantity of ISAF, and broker deals with warring factions to increase security in their
areas. This implies that Afghanistan needs its own Sons of Iraq program, but one that does not place
increased power in the hands of warlords and one that focus entirely on securing the population from
Taliban influence and the actions of common criminals.
Further, combat actions by coalition forces that cause collateral damage must be completely eliminated.
Nothing is more detrimental to winning the support of the population than errant U.S. air strikes that kill
dozens of innocent civilians. This means that all operations need to be planned and executed in a
manner where threats can be mitigated without the need for U.S. air strikes, except in the most remote
locations.
Next, the U.S. must address the widespread disillusionment that has been created not only by the lack
of security and errant U.S. airstrikes, but by the fact that for 8 years the most powerful country in the
world has done little to help improve the basic quality of life of one of the most poor and destitute
peoples in the world. Immediate efforts must be undertaken to bring clean water and electricity to all
Afghans, and jobs must be created that give people hope for a better future. Finally, the dismal health
care system needs to be improved immediately, with improved access to doctors, facilities and drugs for
all Afghans.
All of these efforts must be linked to a comprehensive Information Operations campaign that gives all
Afghans promise and hope for a better future.
The aforementioned actions will help to create the conditions that will allow for near-term security and
implementation of more permanent programs necessary for long term success. In order to achieve this
long term success, the first and foremost important condition that must be created is improvement in
Afghanistan’s education system. A largely illiterate population does not allow for the training of doctors,
lawyers, judges, engineers, international business people, and competent government officials who are
critical to a successful and even semi-developed country. Without education, it will be impossible to
create a thriving Afghan economy that is capable of self-sustainment and not reliant on long-term
international assistance. Indeed, current programs are focused on handing out fish so that Afghans do
not starve, but long-term success will rely on teaching Afghans to fish for themselves. To do this,
education is paramount.
Next, long term success will be impossible without reducing corruption to acceptable levels. While any
corruption might be unacceptable to us in the west, this may also be an impossible goal for Afghanistan.
Instead, efforts should be taken that create accountability within the government system, starting with
the leaders of the national government and permeating down to local village and town leaders. It is hard
to create effective governance and economic systems when approximately 50% of international aid is
ciphered into private accounts. Reducing this to 10% or lower would create the conditions that allow for
long term growth. A fully capable and self-reliant security apparatus is also needed, one that is
accountable to elected officials and to the people alike. This means competent police and internal
security forces that can provide security for every Afghan, as well as a capable military that can protect
the country from external threats.
Finally, Afghanistan needs a functioning economy. Such an economy will likely need to be focused on
agriculture but will also need to expand to other sectors of the economy, namely industry. Creation of a
skilled population through education and training could help Afghanistan to obtain a competitive
advantage in various industries, as it has a large population in need of jobs and who will work for
relatively low wages.
In conclusion, the way ahead will not be easy. The myriad problems that must be overcome are
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daunting. But, if the efforts of the last 8 years are not to be lost, special effort must be made to
implement the short term solutions mentioned in this paper while also undertaking actions for the long
term sustainment and development of the country.
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